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Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon. Indirect
anecdotal evidence is provided by the latest public
economics textbooks, which regularly include chap-
ters on tax evasion; this would have been unusual
just ten years ago.A recent textbook on public eco-
nomics (Hindriks and Myles 2006) states that the
hidden economy (which forms the primary basis for
tax evasion) has reached at least 10 percent of GDP
in advanced countries and it can grow to much high-
er levels (sometimes topping 70 percent) in develop-
ing countries. Moreover, the trend shows no sign of
stopping.
Standard economic models focus on two basic means
of discouraging tax evasion.One is the probability of
audit and the other is the steepness of sanctions to
those who are caught. The specific effectiveness of
these tools is confirmed both by common sense and
by many of the tests used by scholars (experiments,
surveys, econometric studies; Marchese 2004).
Nevertheless, they do not offer a complete solution,
because their reliance on clear-cut antagonism
between the state and the individual tax evader leads
to a cat and mouse problem.1 Thus, they are best
accompanied by a combination of other strategies.
Since tax evasion involves a sizeable share of the
population that wields a certain social and political
weight,it should be possible to design policies that in
some way target the collective nature of such a phe-
nomenon.
As long as tax evasion is pervasive,it will give rise to
positive externalities among evaders, who create a
network that makes incomes and sales easier to hide.
In this context, it becomes far less likely for those
who infringe the law to be caught and punished. As
tax evasion grows more common,the tax administra-
tion undergoes increasing pressure to be lenient or
to accept bribes;political backing for dissuasive poli-
cies may also wane. Hence it seems important to
devise policies that will weaken the confidence
evaders have in the social acceptability of their con-
duct. Ideally, these policies should bolster political
support for policies aimed at reducing tax evasion.
One common strategy for weakening ties among
potential evaders is to introduce various forms of
conflicting interests.For example,VAT is designed to
give rise to a chain of conflicting interests by encour-
aging each firm to procure invoices for its inputs in
order to reduce tax outlays for its outputs.Of course,
the results often fall short of the potential benefits,
since VAT evasion is generally extensive and there
are cases in which even stronger networks arise in
order to hide a full chain of transactions.Yet one can
also consider the glass to be half full rather than half
empty.A recent appraisal of VAT (International Tax
Dialogue VAT Conference, 15–16 March 2005,
Rome) revealed a major increase over the last 20
years in the number of countries applying VAT (with
the US and the Middle East being the main excep-
tions),with proceeds accounting for a rise in percent
of GDP.2 As M. Keen puts it (2005): “More funda-
mentally, however, in many transition and develop-
ing countries ...[VAT] … is a catalyst for moderniza-
tion” as it fosters “voluntary compliance based on
self-assessment (meaning that taxpayers calculate
and pay tax due with minimal intervention by
authorities, but subject to audit and penalty) shifting
tax administration from a system based on direct and
often face-to-face assessment to one based on self-
assessment.”
The presence of conflicting interests, which is just
one of the many characteristics of VAT, undoubted-
ly contributes to reinforcement of a voluntary com-
pliance system. One can thus infer from experience
with VAT that the conflicting interests approach
merits at least some consideration in the design of
tax systems.
Empirical evidence concerning rewards
to consumers
One problem noted by practitioners and in the press
is that the chain of conflicting interests created by
VAT is interrupted when the consumer comes into
play. In one sense, this is an unavoidable conse-
quence of the fact that it is the consumer who must
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bear the brunt of VAT. One can wonder, however, if
introducing partial forms of conflicting interests dur-
ing this final step might improve the working of
either VAT or sales taxes, and also more generally
help prevent evasion of other taxes, such as the
income tax owed on the same economic activity.This
approach inevitably implies a cost (since govern-
ment revenues are reduced if consumers who resort
to legal transactions are rewarded). It is therefore
necessary to ascertain the cost effectiveness of such
a policy in comparison with other forms of interven-
tion.To assess the pros and cons of the method, it is
useful to examine cases in which it has already been
applied.
Tax receipt lotteries
Positive reports have recently come from China,
where a novel system of controlling sales tax evasion
was introduced on an on-going experimental basis in
1989.3 To encourage customers to request official
receipts as proof of payment in the service and retail
commerce sectors, local tax authorities in many
provinces now issue a special type of receipt that
doubles as a lottery ticket. To prevent forging of
receipts, businesses must purchase special, patented
machines for printing them. Records of the printed
receipts are automatically transmitted to the tax
authorities and are used to calculate the taxes
payable on sales. Clearly the lottery should ease the
adoption of secure cash registers apt at enriching the
information available for the tax administration.The
receipts can be used as scratch cards to win small
amounts of cash,but they also serve as lottery tickets
for winning larger amounts.A similar system is in use
in Taiwan and has been used in other countries in
Asia and in Latin America.
The Chinese tax lottery experiment has gradually
been extended to include about 8 percent of districts
or cities.It has grown to include not only restaurants,
beauty salons and real estate agencies but a number
of other services and retail stores as well.The exper-
iment has been widely reported on in the Chinese
media. More recently the municipality of Beijing
decided to tax prizes of above 800 yuan (just short of
80 euros).While this move will reduce the rewards to
consumers, it is a good indicator of the increasing
popularity of the system, for such a tax would only
make sense with a sizeable tax base. According to
Wan (2006) and to the sources quoted therein, the
lottery has had a positive impact upon business tax4
revenue and upon the growth of total tax revenue.
The lottery approach is of course just one of the
many tools used in China for fighting tax evasion.
The list also includes some which are much less
acceptable from a European point of view, such as
the death penalty.
Systems of rewards for consumers in the form of
coupons, monetary or in-kind prizes, etc., are often
used in the commercial sector. Lotteries are also
used as a marketing device, sometimes on a system-
atic basis.For example,banks in Latin America offer
lottery-linked deposit accounts. Those who keep an
account for a given period are entered into lotteries
for small and large prizes. According to Gillén and
Tschoegl (2001) these accounts are a cheaper source
of funds for banks than other accounts.Lotteries are
particularly appealing for low income agents, and
behave as inferior goods.
Monetary subsidies
Another popular means of rewarding consumers for
combating tax evasion is to offer them monetary
subsidies. In the fight against VAT tax evasion, some
developing countries have introduced a far-reaching
refund system for consumers who collect official
receipts.Berhan and Jenkins (2005) studied how this
system works in Northern Cyprus and in Bolivia.The
scheme in Northern Cyprus has been in use since
1996, and resembles the system in use in Turkey. It
offered a refund of 5 percent of taxable purchases
until 2000 and 2.5 percent thereafter, in contrast to
the standard VAT rate,which is 13 percent.The limit
on purchases claimed is given by the monthly salary
for employees. Employers collect the receipts for
their employees and claim refunds on their behalf.
In Bolivia, a withholding tax on wages, salaries and
pensions (the so-called complementary tax), was
introduced in 1986 with the aim of improving the
efficiency of VAT. Consumers are allowed to deduct
the VAT paid on purchases of goods and services, so
the withholding tax has zero expected net revenue.
Berhan and Jenkins (2005) found that these systems
are burdened with very large administration and
3 For a description of this system and an evaluation of its effects,see
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and to the corresponding costs of other taxes in the two
countries.The process of collecting and verifying claims
is extremely time-consuming, and the net benefit for
taxpayers is low.Moreover,the method is vulnerable to
illicit practices.In Northern Cyprus this mainly consists
in the collection of receipts issued to foreigners, stu-
dents, etc., who cannot claim their own refunds. In
Bolivia, instead, there is a black market where false
receipts are also sold, at a price of around 1 percent of
their face value. The Bolivian system seems to work
badly overall, yet abolishing it would damage some
groups and therefore does not seem politically viable.
Past attempts at abolishing the refund system, and at
transforming the withholding tax into a revenue pro-
ducing tax (while giving up the potential benefits in
terms of VAT), have resulted in riots.
Overall, it thus seems that the main obstacle to an
effective system of monetary rewards to consumers
in developing countries is the cost associated with
preventing illegitimate claims.Recently,the IMF rec-
ommended that the Turkish government eliminate its
refund system and replace it with other instruments,
such as a fixed deduction from income (IMF 2007,
16–17). From this point of view, the approach based
on in-kind transfers, and specifically on lottery tick-
ets, represents a clear cut potential improvement
upon monetary subsidies, since far fewer claims must
be verified by the tax administration.
Monetary subsidies to consumption are also often
granted in developed countries for a variety of pur-
poses, not least of which is fighting tax evasion. One
form of subsidies is introduced by allowing deduc-
tion of a fixed percent of expenses for specific items
from the income tax. In Italy, expenditures for home
improvements have been partially deductible from
income tax for the past ten years.The main purpose
of this provision was to improve tax compliance by
firms in the housing sector. New regulations in this
sector have recently been introduced with the spe-
cific aim of cracking down on moonlighting. Under
the 2007 financial law, those who claim the home
improvement deduction must supply an invoice from
the building contractor,including specification of the
expenditure for labor input.
The results in terms of the reduction of tax evasion
have been mixed.The bulk of claims for the subsidy5
come from Northern Italy, which is commonly con-
sidered as less prone to tax evasion to begin with.
While there are some cases of illegitimate claims
under investigation there is no black market for
receipts; fraud seems to arise mainly through falsi-
fied invoices furnished by firms to unsuspecting con-
sumers.While econometric studies of this experience
are not available, raw data show an increase in
reported income and in the number of firms and offi-
cial workers. However, taxable income in the sector
is still growing at a slower rate than gross income as
measured by national accounts.
The economics of rewards
Can monetary subsidies constitute an effective
incentive for consumers to request compliance with
sales taxes? Do they represent a more cost effective
solution than other strategies with the same aim?
One argument in favor of the reward system is that
consumers have an informative advantage over tax
auditors, given they are necessarily in frequent con-
tact with suppliers. Subsidies may therefore operate
as a type of sanction on firms resorting to tax eva-
sion, so long as the consumers involved ask for com-
pensation. Moreover, subsidies are welcomed by
those entitled to claim them,and are thus more polit-
ically viable than sanctions applied to consumers
participating in illegal transactions.
While these arguments are reasonable, one must also
factor in the costs and the many possible undesired
effects stemming from this approach.When the system
works smoothly,it is likely to give rise to some kind of
“market revenge” through an increase in prices. In
fact, rewards represent an expansionary policy; they
therefore create an opportunity for some backward
shifting of benefits to the producers. Hence, the net
gain of consumers is likely to be smaller than the sub-
sidy, and one might construct extreme scenarios in
which an increase in prices, net of the subsidy, may
actually arise. In these cases, firms would be able to
neutralize the system to a large extent. Nevertheless,
the cost of hiding sales and thereby evading the tax is
likely to increase somewhat, as long as the expansion-
ary effect either on quantity or on price implies
greater visibility of the activity for the tax auditor. In
fact, many economic models assume that the cost of
concealment increases as the value of sales rises.
Consumer reaction also plays an important role.
When tax evasion is extremely common, taxpayers
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are likely to experience high transaction and psy-
chological costs in resorting to tax auditors to
enforce the issuing of receipts. However, if con-
sumers bear the brunt of costs for reporting viola-
tions to the authorities, subsidies may nevertheless
induce them to seek out vendors willing to offer
legal transactions. Yet these efforts are also costly.
Whenever a firm chooses to evade, it originates a
positive externality for the whole set of suppliers
by causing an increase in the search costs for the
customers, i.e., it becomes increasingly difficult to
find a vendor willing to engage in legal transac-
tions. When alternatives become difficult to find,
the compensation requested for accepting an ille-
gal transaction falls. As typically happens in these
cases,once a critical mass of tax evasion is reached,
it can jump to much larger values. This process
might also explain why, although many reward sys-
tems have proven successful at the beginning, their
benefits quickly fade. As Richard Bird puts it,
“Unless the public perceives a significantly
improved tax administration that will actually uti-
lize such information and enforce taxes and unless
this perception is soon reinforced by action, any
initial illusory effect seems likely to erode quickly,
leaving the administration buried in a sea of
unused (and probably often falsified) VAT
receipts” (Bird 1992).
Can lotteries work?
The resort to in-kind transfers6 seems to have one
main advantage over monetary transfers. This is
because at least some consumers are likely to have a
large demand price for the good chosen for the in-
kind transfer,even larger than its marginal cost.Thus
each firm’s decision to evade entails a negative
externality, as it contributes to depletion of the pool
of agents not so interested in the good and who are
willing to accept an illegal deal for low compensa-
tion. In-kind transfers are therefore more cost effec-
tive than monetary ones as long as those who receive
them value the transferred good more than its mar-
ginal production cost. A price above the marginal
cost is generally seen as a source of inefficiency by
economists. However, this is not necessarily the case
with lotteries. Since gambling produces negative
externalities, it is everywhere routinely regulated
and taxed all over the world. Lotteries offer the fur-
ther advantage of low administrative costs.
While for an amoral taxpayer tax evasion may be
seen as a form of gambling whose prize is the unpaid
tax,rewards to consumers in the form of lottery tick-
ets aim at creating a symmetrical wager,in which the
prize is a share of the paid tax.This leads inevitably
to smaller prizes than the tax evasion, so long as a
share of the tax is kept as revenue by the state.
However, the tax receipt targets agents for whom its
legal character and concomitant lack of shame or
stigma, potential social approval, emphasized by the
media, for performing a meritorious task and an
appeal to those who like gambling might contribute
to its effectiveness. A further critical factor for suc-
cess is the competitive nature of the market in which
the system is introduced. In particular, a large num-
ber of smaller suppliers makes it more difficult to
coordinate efforts to internalize the externalities.
Epidemics of tax evasion are obviously still possible,
unless other standard forms of intervention such as
controls and sanctions can guarantee a large enough
basis of compliance to make it worthwhile to seek
vendors willing to trade legally.
From the point of view of equity, so long as lotter-
ies are inferior goods they should give rise to trans-
fers that have a larger value for the poor who
receive them. On the other hand, one of the draw-
backs to the lottery scheme is the possible substitu-
tion effect upon the demand for other forms of
gambling supplied by the government.A more gen-
eral caveat relating to both monetary transfers and
lotteries concerns the potential for crowding-out
effects in the realm of intrinsic (moral) motivations
for paying taxes and obeying fiscal laws. This is a
matter for concern,since,in a certain sense,compli-
ance becomes conditional on some form of com-
pensation.
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